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GOVERNANCE OF BUILT-HERITAGE IN A RESTRICTIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM: 
THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL STAKEHOLDERS 
Abstract 
Built-heritage conservation has increasingly become Hong Kong people’s urgent 
concern since the years leading up to the territory’s change of sovereignty from Great 
Britain to China, under political rules in which development takes priority over 
conservation. Built-heritage is a symbol of cultural identity and thus Hong Kong 
people’s awareness of the importance of preserving them (Henderson, 2008). NGOs’ 
sense of urgency in getting involved in built-heritage conservation also stems from 
operating within a political system which Scott (2010) describes as having a 
restrictive policy-making process, lacking in responsiveness to public demands and 
expectations. NGOs have three basic functions, namely, service provision, advocacy, 
and monitoring. Two case studies are used to illustrate these functions. The findings 
indicate that NGOs are most intensely involved in advocacy. NGOs involved in 
service provision have been selected through tightly-controlled processes. NGOs’ 
monitoring activities were very limited. I argue that NGOs’ role in built-heritage 
conservation is limited due to the restrictive political system. However, NGOs 
demonstrated insistent and resilient opposition to any top-down approach to 
decision-making is a sign that leads to the belief that despite of and because of the 
nature of the political system, NGOs’ involvement in built-heritage is not only likely 
to intensify but also expand with government increasing the openness of the policy 
process to contain public pressure.  
Keywords: NGOs, built-heritage conservation, service provision, advocacy, 
monitoring, civil society 
Introduction 
For the most part of the colonial era, cultural heritage was not a priority for the 
government and the Hong Kong people. For Britain, Hong Kong was to be 
transformed into a commercial port and a port of call for the British navy. For 
majority of its residents, Hong Kong was a place of refuge from the political and 
economic turmoil in the Mainland as well as an ideal place to make profit. (Yung and 
Chan, 2011) However, as the reunification of Hong Kong to the Motherland in 1997 
approached, local residents’ awareness of the importance of conserving their city’s 
heritage sites increased (Henderson 2008). Hongkongers consider heritage structures 
as witness to their unique cultural identity (Yung and Chan, 2011; Lu 2009) which is 
different from that of the Mainland Chinese (Henderson, 2002). The dismantling of 
the Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier in Central in 2007 particularly marked an 
important period in the history of built-heritage conservation in Hong Kong. 
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Conservationists’ expressed strong and passionate opposition such as hunger strikes, 
sending a letter to the Secretary for Development written with their own blood, and 
chaining themselves to columns around the pier on the eve of the demolition day. 
(Henderson, 2008) These events and similar others prompted the Chief Executive to 
acknowledge Hong Kong people’s passion for culture and promised to pay greater 
attention to heritage conservation (Tsang, 2007).  
While the government recognized this change in Hong Kong people’s attitude, 
development continued to take priority over heritage conservation due to various 
factors such as increasing demand for housing and office space, limited amount of 
developable land, huge constraints to land reclamation, and land premium being one 
of the major sources of government revenue. As Lung (2012: 132) puts it, 
“…heritage is not solely a cultural issue. When it comes to implementation, it is an 
issue of land economics.”  
A more important factor is the restrictive political system in which the government 
tends to consider its policy views superior to those of the public (Scott, 2010). Other 
scholars on Hong Kong politics (Ma, 2007; Cheung, 2008) hold the same view as 
Scott (2010). However, some signs of a more open policy process have been seen 
(Cheung, 2011), particularly in the area of built-heritage conservation since its 
purview has been transferred to the Development Bureau in July 2007. At the same 
time, caution is needed about concluding that the changes are adequate in responding 
and taking into account stakeholders’ views and interests. 
This article examines the roles of NGOs in built-heritage conservation in Hong Kong, 
using two case studies involving heritage sites, namely, Central Police Station (CPS) 
and Police Married Quarters (PMQ). Data for analysis were collected from 
documentation and some interviews. The documentation examined include, among 
others, relevant papers, memoranda, and minutes of meetings or hearings of the 
Legislative Council, District Councils, Antiquities Advisory Board, Town Planning 
Board and Metro Planning Committee; NGOs’ annual reports; newspaper reports and 
articles. Fourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with relevant NGOs and 
government officials, each lasting for more than an hour. Snowball sampling was used 
to identify possible informants for the subsequent interviews. Few studies have 
examined public involvement in built-heritage conservation (Li, 2014). Of these, only 
a few relate to Hong Kong (for example, Cheung, 2011; Yung and Chan, 2011; 
Cheng and Ma, 2009). 
The following section provides a review of academic literature on the role of NGOs. 
This is followed by a brief description of the features of the Hong Kong political 
system, informed by Scott’s (2010) thesis. The two case studies are then introduced, 
followed by their involvement in terms of their basic roles of service provision, 
advocacy, and monitoring. The last section analyzes the findings in relation to how 
NGOs’ roles in built-heritage conservation in Hong Kong are influenced by the 
political system. 
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Roles of NGOs: service provision, advocacy, and monitoring 
Many definitions of NGO commonly stress NGO’s not-for-profit and autonomous 
nature (Salamon, 1994; Clarke, 1998; Kim 2000). NGOs are an important type of 
civil society organization concerned with defending civil society from state 
encroachment (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Bernhard, 1993; Diamond, 1994). Civil 
society is a space between the public sphere (state) and private sphere (family), on the 
one hand, and from the market economy, on the other. While the state and civil 
society are separate spheres, they constitute one another and therefore their 
relationship is symbiotic and complementary (Chandhoke, 1995). 
A review of the literature indicates three conventional functions of NGOs, namely, 
service provision, advocacy, and monitoring. These three functions are analytically 
distinct from each other. The focus in service provision is the creation of benefits for 
the people without actual changes in policy; the objective in advocacy is policy 
influence (Jenkins, 1987 in Powell, 1987); the aim of monitoring is to ensure the 
implementation of a policy or program according to regulation or decision. While in 
other places education or socialization and mobilization are treated as distinct 
functions of NGOs (Foley and Edwards, 1998), in this study these are considered as 
strategies in advocacy, because NGOs use them not as ends in themselves but as 
means to influence policy. 
Service provision involves providing services directly to the public (Foley and 
Edwards, 1998) or filling in gaps in the service-delivery role of the government 
which is unable to provide an urgent service adequately to the needy members of a 
community (Salamon, 2002). The goods and services NGOs can provide are varied in 
scope. In the context of built-heritage conservation, NGOs provide goods and services 
by managing built-heritage conservation projects (Cheng, Li and Ma, 2014). 
Advocacy, according to Jenkins (2006 in De Brelaz and Alvez, 2009: 153), “aims to 
influence the decisions of an institutional elite in favor of a collective interest.” 
Citizens promote change, either in legislation or state policy, in order to address a 
problem or demand and to seek a solution, which they think is more beneficial to the 
public than the one proposed by the government (Diamond, 1994). In built-heritage 
conservation, NGOs attempt to influence government decisions regarding the 
conservation, after use, and design of conservation projects. NGOs’ advocacy work 
involves different types of activity. NGOs form coalitions or alliances with other 
groups and individuals in order to put greater pressure on the state. NGOs pool in 
their resources together, whether personnel, information or funds, to achieve a goal 
collectively (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Bondaroff, 2014).  
While monitoring is closely related to advocacy, the former is analytically distinct 
from the latter because the goal of the former is compliance. NGOs monitor 
government performance (Ghaus-Pasha, 2004) and the implementation of a policy 
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(Hoang, 2013); check abuses of state power and violations of the law (Diamond, 
1994); and, undertake activities to expand government accountability (Lane and 
Morrison, 2006). NGOs’ watchdog activities contribute to good governance 
(Ghaus-Pasha, 2004). NGOs’ monitoring activities involve various activities and 
cover various aspects of government work. In built-heritage conservation, NGOs 
monitor the implementation of heritage conservation policy in various ways such as 
how grading criteria are applied in the grading process of heritage sites and whether 
graded heritage sites receive due protection.  
Hong Kong’s restrictive political system 
Hong Kong has a restrictive political system characterized by a policy process where 
“the government tended to ignore those views that did not correspond with its own” 
(Scott, 2010: 183). Hong Kong has yet to develop full democracy for the selection of 
the Chief Executive, and making the city’s top policy makers appointed through the 
Political Appointment System accountable to a Chief Executive does little to ensure 
responsiveness to stakeholders’ interests (Cheung, 2005). The Chief Executive, his 
appointed political advisors, and high ranking civil servants dominate the 
policy-making process, leaving little room for public participation in the policy 
process (Yung and Chan, 2011). Constitutionally the Legislative Council’s oversight 
powers are weak vis-à-vis the executive (Ma, 2007). The functional constituency 
system in the legislature and the Election Committee institutionalizes corporatism 
fosters government-business collusion in decision-making (Cheung, 2008). The 
numerous advisory and statutory bodies are seen as no more than a co-optation tool 
for political patronage (Cheung and Wong, 2004), political window dressing (Hood, 
1981), and pre-empting potential opposition to government policies (Miners, 2000). 
These advisory bodies lack independence and do not have a significant role in the 
policy process (Cheung, 2011). While advisory bodies incorporate societal elements, 
their advice is not binding (Holliday and Hui in Lam et al. 2007). Public 
consultations carried out by the government on policy issues are seen as tokenistic 
and are largely considered as a unidirectional form of engagement (CCSG, 2007; Lee 
and Thynne, 2011).  
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Two built-heritage conservation case studies 
 
Figure 1: (Source: Commissioner for Heritage’s Office of the Development Bureau) 
 
The CPS compound (Figure 1), comprising three groups of buildings namely, the 
Central Police Station, the former Central Magistracy and Victoria Prison, represent 
law and order in Hong Kong. CPS was declared a monument on September 8, 1995. 
(AMO, 2004) In 2002, the government announced its plan to develop CPS into a 
heritage tourism project. In 2003, the Town Planning Board rezoned1 the site from 
“Government, Institution and Community” to “Other Uses,” and arrangements were 
made to invite the private sector to submit development proposals for the site which 
could yield as much as 220,580 square feet of space for commercial development 
                                                             
1 The Town Planning Board, a statutory board established with the enactment of the Town Planning 
Ordinance in 1939, is responsible for “making provision for the systematic preparation and approval of 
plans for the lay-out of areas of Hong Kong as well as for the types of building suitable for erection 
therein and for the preparation and approval of plans for areas within which permission is required for 
development” (TPO, 1939: 1). The Outline Zoning Plans prepared by the Town Planning Board 
indicate the land-use zonings of individual planning scheme areas. Some examples of land-use zonings 
relevant to this study are Residential (Group A); Government, Institution and Community; Open Space; 
Specified for Other Uses; Greenbelt; and, Creative Industries. Land-use zonings can be annotated to 
indicate planning intentions. Land-use rezoning requires a Section 12A application that goes through 
the plan-making process administered by the Town Planning Board, involving a statutory publication 
period to allow the public to submit comments and representations, in support or in opposition, to 
relevant applications, and a statutory hearing, to allow the applicants and those who submitted 
comments and representations to address Board officials directly. 
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(Moir, 2004). The Advisory Committee on Revitalization of Historic Buildings was 
formed to assess proposals, comprising various officials from relevant bureaus and 
departments, and representatives from the Antiquities Advisory Board and Hong 
Kong Tourism Board as non-scoring members. The private development was 
eventually scrapped and the Hong Kong Jockey Club was chosen to revitalize the site 
as a heritage tourism attraction and a cultural landmark, providing cultural and arts 
facilities such as exhibition venues, theatre and cinema. CPS was rezoned to “Other 
Specified Uses” annotated “Historical Site Preserved for Cultural, Recreational, and 
Commercial Uses,” and granted permission to Hong Kong Jockey Club to develop the 
site (TPB, 2011b). Revitalization works began in September 2012 and were 
completed in 2014. CPS is set to be opened to the public in 2015.   
The former PMQ (Figure 2), comprising two quarters blocks and an ancillary Junior 
Police Call Clubhouse building, was built in 1951 for married rank and file police 
officers, including Chinese. The former Chief Executive, Mr. Tsang Yam-kuen 
(2005-2012), spent his childhood years in the PMQ where his father served as a police 
officer for the Royal Hong Kong Police Force. While it is only a Grade Three2 
heritage building, it is historically significant as it sits on the remains of the former 
Central School (Figures 3 and 4), the first government school to provide Western 
education to the public, and the school’s link to Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, founder of modern 
China.  
 
Figure 2 (Source: Commissioner for Heritage’s Office of the Development Bureau) 
 
                                                             
2 In Hong Kong, the existing heritage grading system has three grades, namely, Grade One, for 
buildings of outstanding merit; Grade Two, for buildings of special merit; and, Grade Three, for 
buildings of some merit. Graded buildings do not have any statutory protection. (DB, 2007) 
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In 1998, PMQ was rezoned for residential development. In 2000, was included in the 
List of Sites for Sale. The site had a market value of 3.7 billion Hong Kong dollars 
and a potential of yielding 844,000 square feet of residential space. Eventually, the 
government decided to cancel the private tender and invite proposals to develop PMQ 
for creative industries and education, providing studios for rent, venues for design 
activities, and public open space. In January 2010, the PMQ site was rezoned from 
“Residential” to “Other Specified Uses” annotated "Heritage Site for Creative  
 
Figure 3 (Source: Commissioner for Heritage’s Office of the Development Bureau) 
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Figure 4: Excavated remains of Central School (Source: Commissioner for Heritage’s Office 
of the Development Bureau) 
 
Industries and Related Uses" (TPB, 2010a; TPB, 2010b). The assessment panel 
assessed four proposals, and selected the design submitted by the Three Musketeers 
Education and Culture Charitable Foundation Limited which provided a seed fund of 
110 million Hong Kong dollars. Revitalization works began in January 2012, and was 
completed at the end of 2013. It was officially inaugurated in 2014. 
NGO involvement in built-heritage conservation 
Service provision role 
In 2003, the government decided to earmark the CPS site for a heritage-related 
tourism project and scheduled a private tender for 2004. The successful bidder would 
be required to pay a land premium up front in return for a fifty-year lease. Robert Ho 
Yau-chung, Chairman of the Robert H.N. Ho Family Foundation, a philanthropic 
Foundation, became concerned about government plans for CPS, and was reported 
saying, “We felt that if past experience is any good example...the eventual 
development is going to be pretty disappointing” (Moir, 2004: EDT 12). The past 
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experience he referred to was the “government’s track record of in turning historical 
sites into restaurants or supermarkets” (Moir, 2004: EDT 12). Mr. Ho approached the 
government and had several meetings with top officials to discuss his proposal of 
converting CPS into a large arts academy funded by five hundred million in donations, 
provided the government offered the site on a private treaty grant basis, with little or 
no land premium. The arts complex would be run by a non-profit foundation or trust, 
which should be allowed to charge on a cost recovery basis with any surplus revenue 
ploughed back into development. The complex would include revenue-generating 
space such as cafes, display areas, galleries, and small studio theatres for artists. 
According to Mr. Ho, three or four established Hong Kong families have already 
pledged to give a total of one hundred million, and he was confident of being able to 
raise other four hundred million which would be used for the restoration of the CPS 
compound. However, the proposal was not approved and the Tourism Commission 
announced that the private tender would take place as scheduled. Thus, an attempt by 
an NGO to provide goods and services in built-heritage conservation failed. 
Advocacy role 
Conservationist NGOs were actively advocating for the preservation of CPS. 
Conservancy Association submitted a Section 12A application3 to the Town Planning 
Board in 2002 and organized a public workshop in 2003. In 2004, an alliance of 
several NGOs formed the CPS Heritage Taskforce and organized public participation 
activities to raise public awareness and to rally public support, advocating for a 
‘Heritage First’ principle and a Citizen-Envisioned Participatory Assessment Model. 
They carried out a public survey and publicized the results in local newspapers. 
Representatives from various NGOs attended a Legislative Council panel meeting in 
2004, demanding that the tendering exercise be cancelled and that monetary 
considerations should not take priority over preservation. (LC, 2004) 
In November 2006, Conservancy Association and Heritage Hong Kong Foundation 
urged the Town Planning Board to introduce a Planning Brief4 to the Schedule of 
Notes5 of CPS indicating a maximum building height restriction. The representation 
was not upheld, but several sympathetic comments from Board members were heard 
during the hearing. When Conservancy Association and Heritage Hong Kong 
Foundation found out that these supportive remarks had been toned down in the 
minutes, they launched a judicial review, accusing the government of manipulating 
the minutes. However, the judicial review was withdrawn when the government 
                                                             
3 Cf. Footnote 1 
4 A planning brief sets out the planning parameters and development requirements for a specific area, 
for example, building height restrictions and plot ratio (PD, 2011). 
5 Each plan is accompanied by a Schedule of Notes which show for a particular zone the uses always 
permitted (Column One Uses) and uses that would require permission from the Town Planning Board 
(Column Two Uses) upon application (PD, 2005). 
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cancelled the private tender and announced that the revitalization of CPS would be 
entrusted to the Hong Kong Jockey Club.  
NGOs criticized the selection process from which they were excluded and the 
conceptual design proposed by Hong Kong Jockey Club. A series of public 
consultation exercises were held in 2007-2008 during which NGOs criticized the 
height of the proposed new structure and the demolition of some existing structures. 
Heritage Hong Kong Foundation organized their own exhibition proposing alternative 
designs and asked the public to give comments. In 2009, an alliance of thirteen NGOs 
urged the Town Planning Board to include a building height restriction in the 
Schedule of Notes. Majority of the public comments received supported the 
application (TPB, 2009). But the application was again not upheld. However, the 
height of the new structure was eventually reduced significantly (TPB 2010b). 
Central and Western Concern Group took the lead in advocating for the preservation 
of PMQ, submitting several rezoning applications to the Town Planning Board in 
2005, 2007 and 2008 (TPB, 2005; TPB, 2007; TPB, 2008). During the statutory 
publication periods of the planning process, they tried to raise public awareness by 
organizing exhibitions, information displays, and signature campaigns. They also sent 
letters to relevant government departments, providing supplementary information 
about the significance of the site. They urged the Town Planning Board to limit 
high-rise development and plot ratio in favor of public open spaces and minimizing 
negative impact on traffic flow and air quality. Unfortunately, none of these 
applications were upheld by the Town Planning Board. However, the government 
eventually decided to remove the site from the Land Sale List and to revitalize PMQ 
as a hub for creative industries and education. The government also scrapped the 
proposed two high-rise residential towers and the plan to demolish the Junior Police 
Call. While these were positive developments, the selection of project operator lacked 
adequate public participation which Central and Western Concern Group criticized 
(TPB, 2011a). 
Monitoring role 
Central and Western Concern Group acted as a watchdog in the CPS case, particularly 
when they criticized the government for what they considered as a procedural 
anomaly in the approval of the Environmental Impact Assessment and the issuance of 
the environmental permit by the Environmental Protection Department even before 
the archaeological investigation was conducted. Albert Lai, one of the Directors of 
Conservancy Association, questioned the practice, criticizing it as a compliant report 
and accusing the government of disregarding the checks-and-balance system (Ng, 
2011).  
In 2007, Central and Western Concern Group was granted permission to be present 
during the archaeological investigation on the PMQ site. The Group monitored the 
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investigation and informed the public through the media of its progress. The Central 
School remnants found during the archaeological investigation were substantial, and 
initially, as the Group noted, there was reluctance on the part of the government to be 
transparent and clear about the findings during their meeting with the Central and 
Western District Council. (Batten and Law, 2008: 4)  
NGOs tried to make the officials of Antiquities Advisory Board and Town Planning 
Board more accountable to the public. They ‘appealed to the conscience’ of officials, 
urging them to decide based on public interest and not to toe the government’s line. In 
a 2005 Town Planning Board hearing on PMQ, NGOs addressed the following words 
to officials: “the Board should take a proactive approach for preservation of heritage, 
rather than pending the Government’s review of the heritage preservation policy” 
(TPB, 2005: 29). In 2006, NGOs told officials “…take on a custodian/stewardship 
role of the site…and take up the role of arbiter in determining the appropriate uses or 
development of the CPS compound in future” (TPB, 2006: 19-20). Heritage Hong 
Kong Foundation criticized the Town Planning Board officials for not performing 
their duty of setting the key planning parameters, including BHR, to guide the project 
planning (TPB, 2009: 13-14) An informant remarked, “We keep on telling the Board 
to do what they are supposed to do. They tend to follow what the government is 
putting up.” (interview 2012)  
Findings 
Taking two controversial built-heritage conservation cases, this article examines the 
role of NGOs in policy-making in Hong Kong in terms of the basic functions of 
service provision, advocacy, and monitoring. The findings show that NGOs in 
built-heritage conservation in Hong Kong are most active in political advocacy, with 
limited activity in service provision and monitoring. NGOs’ involvement in service 
provision is hampered by two possible constraints: internal and external. The main 
internal constraint is the lack of economic resources to provide goods and services in 
built-heritage conservation which are normally very costly. NGOs, whether new and 
small such as Central and Western Concern Group or well-established such as 
Conservancy Association, may not have the financial capacity to carry out such 
function. But even if NGOs have the economic resources, as in the case of a 
philanthropic foundation run by Robert Ho Yau-chung, who could have easily raised 
sufficient funds from his network of rich families to operate the CPS project, external 
forces such as the political context may restrict them from participating in service 
provision.  
For example, the lack of clear and consistent criteria for the selection of operator, 
observed in two of the case studies, indicates the kind of political context in which 
Hong Kong NGOs operate. In the selection of the Three Musketeers to operate the 
PMQ project, track record seems to be not as crucial as economic capacity. In the CPS 
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case, the government did not entrust the project to a philanthropic foundation even 
though it had proven to have the financial capacity. While the Hong Kong Jockey 
Club and the Musketeers Foundation are also NGOs, their selection however was 
done within an arrangement in which a continued control over the processes and the 
outcomes can be maintained by the government. HKJC was selected, after closed door 
talks between two parties, without any tendering process. The Musketeers Foundation 
was selected by the Advisory Committee on the Revitalization of Historic Buildings, 
comprising official members who are former government officials and non-official 
members.  
Furthermore, NGOs’ monitoring activities were rather episodic and were absent in the 
implementation stage of the project. Except for the monitoring of the archaeological 
investigation of the PMQ site by Central and Western Concern Group, NGOs’ 
monitoring function basically consisted of pointing out and criticizing officials for 
anomalies in administrative procedures or for discrepancies between actual and 
perceived functions of advisory bodies. NGOs’ monitoring activities were observed 
only during the planning stages, particularly during the statutory publication period. 
Once decisions have been finalized, they were difficult to change, and NGOs may not 
have the motivation to monitor the implementation of a decision which did not in the 
first place satisfy their demands. 
Political advocacy is the function which was most actively performed by NGOs. They 
used a variety of means and strategies to express their views and to attempt to 
influence decisions. The means they used ranged from sending letters or proposals to 
government departments or agencies to participating government-initiated public 
forums, workshops, focus groups, open days, and exhibitions to participating in the 
plan making process of the Town Planning Board which included submitting 
applications, attending hearings, and sending comments during statutory publication 
periods to attending Legislative Council panel meeting to launching judicial reviews. 
NGOs also organized their own signature campaigns, exhibitions, surveys, and public 
forums. In addition, they used the media such as radio talk programs and newspapers 
to express their views, and they organized protest actions in their attempt to put more 
pressure on the government and to influence decisions.  
The findings indicate that the methods and strategies used by NGOs to engage the 
government were impressive both in numbers and diversity. It can be said that the 
NGOs used a multi-channel approach, exhausting the methods available within the 
system, which required not an insignificant amount of resources. Applications to the 
Town Planning Board require technical information and understanding of planning 
which NGOs may not possess. But they were creative in overcoming their limitations, 
making alliances with other NGOs, tapping technical knowledge and skills within 
their networks, and using the media to disseminate information which lowers down 
the cost of trying to influence government decisions. NGOs have shown that they 
were prepared to take whatever action possible to prevent the government from 
making decisions without sufficiently engaging and being responsive to public views. 
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This included even using legal means which, according to Cheung and Wong (2006), 
Hongkongers have increasingly used to challenge government decisions. Heritage 
Hong Kong Foundation has experienced government’s wariness about such legal 
challenges. The Foundation and other NGOs would have no doubt thought of judicial 
reviews as a strategy to put pressure on the government to listen to their views. 
The policy process involved in the case studies was more open. Some restructuring of 
government departments, reallocation of responsibilities, new approaches in engaging 
the public and procedural reforms contributed to the enhancement of inclusiveness 
and transparency of participation processes. Some reforms to the Town Planning 
Board procedures in 2005 enhanced transparency, for example, the public was given 
access to hearing minutes. When Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor became the Secretary 
for Development Bureau (2007-2012), she promoted more public participation in 
policy development, confirmed, for example, by the number and different types of 
engagement methods used in the area of built-heritage conservation. These are signs 
of some improvements from the conventional approach taken by the Hong Kong 
government to public consultation. 
Discussion 
The above phenomenon with regard to NGO’s role in policy development is both a 
consequence of and a reaction to the restrictive political system. Given the political 
context, NGOs’ role in the policy process in terms of service provision and 
monitoring is limited, and has mainly focused on political advocacy. Another way of 
understanding this phenomenon, especially the focus on political advocacy, is that 
NGOs have experienced that their advocacy work has made an impact, although 
limited but not necessarily insignificant, on final decisions, and have therefore used 
this as a strategy to compensate for limited role allowed by the system in service 
provision and monitoring.  
Furthermore, NGOs’ and stakeholders are not satisfied with these changes which have 
emphasized administrative more than statutory changes. Relevant advisory bodies 
continue to lack independence and the government-initiated participation methods, 
though more inclusive still lack responsiveness to public views. NGOs’ limited 
involvement in built-heritage conservation in terms of their basic functions of service 
provision and monitoring also reflect a lack of consistency in government’s 
commitment to engage the public which corroborates Scott’s (2010: 304) observation 
that "the government's willingness to engage with civic groups is not a standard 
practice; it engages on some issues but not on others." The changes to the original 
plans and design for the relevant built-heritage sites, which were not insignificant, 
suggest that NGOs’ involvement had had an impact on the decision-making process. 
However, what appears as government responsiveness may be only a tokenistic 
reaction to diffuse increasing public pressure instead of a genuine intent to share 
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power. The former has been a typical tactic to maintain legitimacy within a situation 
of a lack of democratic governance (Ma, 2007; CCSG, 2007; Scott, 2010).  
Based on the study’s findings, it is important to note that built-heritage conservation is 
not just about the politics of identity but also about the politics of space. Adaptive 
reuse of heritage buildings also contributes to the reduction of greenhouse gases as it 
extends the life of buildings and avoids demolition wastes (Yung and Chan, 2012). 
NGOs consider built-heritage conservation as a means to provide Hong Kong people 
good living environment consisting of adequate public open space, smooth traffic 
flow, and good air quality. 
Participation has the capacity to enhance the legitimacy of decisions and to build trust 
in government. NGO involvement in built-heritage conservation policy-making in 
Hong Kong can be seen as part of a global phenomenon. Citizens nowadays are more 
willing to accept, support and trust decisions made with their involvement rather than 
by the government or state-commissioned experts alone doing it on their behalf 
(OECD, 2005). Abundant literature on public participation also provide an indication 
of the level of involvement of civil society in various policy areas in terms of 
advocacy, service provision, and monitoring (for example, Zhan and Tang, 2013; 
Ahsan et al. 2012; Lakin, 2011; Pawelke, 2010; Obot, 2004; Rakodi, 1989). 
Engaging citizens in policy-making can result in greater trust in governments (OECD, 
2001) which is essential not only for building effective working relationships (Tsang 
et al. 2009), but also “for the legitimacy of governance in policy development” 
(OECD, 2005: 86), the latter being particularly important in a political system lacking 
in democratic legitimacy (Scott, 2010). Additionally, trust reduces transaction costs of 
political bargaining (Tsang et al. 2009) and of policy implementation (Mandarano, 
2009). Models of participatory processes such as collaborative planning lead to the 
formation of trust, which in turn fosters cooperative attitudes, necessary to achieving 
positive and successful outcomes (Mandarano, 2009). 
Much of the extent to which NGOs can influence decisions depends on their creativity 
in enacting their participation. A research study that examines NGOs’ strategies and 
the degree to which these can impact on the policy process can provide insights into 
the workings of public participation in Hong Kong and other places under 
quasi-democratic systems. Another research direction is to empirically establish the 
relationship between trust building and transaction cost (Coase, 1960) reduction in the 
process of political instead of market coordination. The study could hopefully provide 
governments interested in reducing transaction costs the impetus to foster trust 
formation by promoting participatory policy-making processes.  
Conclusion 
Although currently NGOs’ role in built-heritage conservation is mainly limited to 
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advocacy, there are signs that not only will they increase and diversify their advocacy 
work but also continue to try to expand their involvement in service provision and 
monitoring despite and because of the restrictive political system. One of the signs 
stems from the fact that Hong Kong has a vibrant and active civil society (Ma, 2007; 
Cheung, 2008). This article stresses an important feature of NGOs, inherent in them 
as civil society organizations, which is to defend civil society from state 
encroachment. According to Burns (2004: 36), there has been clear evidence that 
“Hong Kong people are now more demanding, better organized, better resourced and 
better able to articulate their interests.” The study shows that they used various means 
and strategies to defend civil society, opposing a top-down approach to 
decision-making, which has often characterized Hong Kong policy process (Scott, 
2010), and public consultation exercises, which are characterized by tokenism rather 
than responsiveness (CCSG, 2007). With a policy-making process captured by the 
state which is, in turn, captured by business through an institutionalized corporatism 
built into the system (Cheung, 2008), NGOs and the community continue to harbor a 
deep-seated suspicion of government priorities when deciding between conservation 
and development which will lead NGOs to try to expand their role in built-heritage 
conservation. 
The institutionalization of formal channels of participation is a good first step on the 
road towards enhancing the role of NGOs in built-heritage conservation particularly 
in service provision and monitoring. If taking into account stakeholders’ interests is 
important for better planning and management of military heritage (Lai and Ho, 
2003), this not only holds true but also even more urgent in the case of built-heritage 
where there are more values at stake. Concretely, there is a need for re-visiting the 
review exercise on the role and functions of the advisory and statutory bodies 
conducted by the Home Affairs Bureau in 2003 which although have dealt with 
important matters have skirted the more basic issue of the ways in which these bodies 
can enhance public engagement (Cheung, 2011). A second phase of the review 
exercise is necessary this time to address the core matters of openness, effectiveness, 
representativeness, and independence (Scott, 2006); work, power, and responsibility 
arrangements (Thynne, 2006). 
In addition, there is a need for setting up a public engagement mechanism operating 
under a framework that provides substantial opportunities for stakeholders and 
officials to work together in designing the conservation and development parameters 
for the revitalization of a specific heritage site; in setting out the criteria for the 
selection of project design and project operator; and so on. This contributes to 
improving governance (OECD, 2005) and the work of policy makers whose task it is 
to “monitor the needs and aspirations of the community and having regard to the 
findings, to undertake timely review and to generate proposals” (CAB, 2002), to 
make decisions that are more aligned with public demands and expectations. The 
separation between the state and civil society does not presuppose disconnection. The 
state and civil society constitutes and informs one another (Chandhoke, 1995). While 
it is important to maintain their separation to protect civil society’s autonomy, their 
16 
 
connection is no less important which reflects their complementary roles and fosters 
effective policy-making.  
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